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from governments. 
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1. Asset separation effec-
tively forces banks to write
down the value of bad
assets. In addition, costs
are indirectly imposed on
shareholders, for example,
through lower earnings per
share and possibly to credi-
tors and large depositors if
the bank needs to restruc-
ture their obligations due to
having smaller funds avail-
able to meet them.
2. COM (2012) 0280,
Proposal for a directive of
the European Parliament
and of the Council
establishing a framework
for the recovery and
resolution of credit
institutions and investment
firms, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/L
exUriServ.do?uri=COM:201
2:0280:FIN:EN:HTML.
3. When we refer to the SRM
we specifically mean COM
(2013) 0520, Proposal for a
regulation of the European
Parliament and of the
Council establishing
uniform rules and a uniform
procedure for the resolution
of credit institutions and
certain investment firms,
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/L
exUriServ.do?uri=COM:201
3:0520:FIN:EN:HTML.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAS SPURRED the further
development of a European banking union. After
making progress on the first step – shared finan-
cial regulation under the European Central Bank's
supervision for the larger banks – European deci-
sion-makers have focused on how to resolve
financial crises. A fundamental problem is the abil-
ity of European governments to commit credibly
to politically unpopular resolution measures.
Before a crisis, a government can state that it will
not hesitate to close insolvent banks. It can signal
that the banks’ shareholders, creditors and depos-
itors over the guaranteed amount (€100,000 in
European Union member states) will be bailed-in
and bear losses. It can also indicate that it would
replace management if the public sector is
involved in the bank restructuring. These state-
ments are reasonable attempts ex ante to min-
imise public costs and avoid moral hazard. 
During a crisis, however, these commitments may
not be credible. Imposing losses on shareholders,
creditors and depositors could be politically
unpopular. Furthermore, in systemic crises it
might be difficult to impose loses on banks with-
out needlessly destroying bank value. Announc-
ing a bail-in of a bank’s shareholders, creditors and
large depositors could lead them to rapidly
remove their funds from the bank. Bank runs
worsen and hasten bank failures. Shareholders,
creditors and large depositors at other banks
might also withdraw their funds in anticipation
that a bail-in of their own bank is on the way. This
process is effectively what we saw during the
Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008.
Formal bail-ins are only one tool proposed for
European bank resolution. European Commission
proposals also allow for separating troubled
assets from a bank, transferring all or part of a
troubled bank’s business to a bridge institution
and selling the bank. These tools can be used to
impose costs on banks for their resolution, but
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generally do not lead to rapid bank runs. For exam-
ple, asset separation is the acquiring of assets
from a failing bank by a public institution at a cer-
tain price. These assets are then placed in a spe-
cial purpose vehicle – a ‘bad bank’ – that manages
and sells them. This aids resolution by injecting
capital into the banks and removing difficult
assets, allowing banks to focus on their core activ-
ities. Resolution costs are also imposed on banks1
when assets are acquired at a price less than their
original book value. Selling troubled banks and
transferring part or all of a bank’s business into a
bridge bank that is then sold can also impose
loses on shareholders and creditors depending on
what support is given to the bank to restructure it
before sale and what price it is sold for. 
We argue that the consistency and effectiveness
of these tools for imposing costs on banks in a
European framework depends on which level of
government takes decisions and how they are
overseen. That is, to what extent are the relevant
authorities national or supranational?
We first briefly lay out two highly contrasting pos-
sibilities for which level of government could plan
resolution and oversee its implementation. The
Commission proposed the Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive (BRRD, COM (2012) 0280) in
June 20122and a regulation establishing a Euro-
pean Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)3and a
Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF) in July 2013
(COM (2013) 0520). The BRRD without the Euro-
pean level represents an approach that relies the
most on national authorities, while the BRRD plus
a Single Resolution Mechanism represents the
maximum participation of European institutions
that has been proposed and is therefore the most
supranational of the options currently on the table.
(Figure 1). Though the actual system chosen prob-
ably will lie between these proposals, contrasting
them helps us examine how the decision-making
level will likely impact the ability to use the four03
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turn. Table 1 on the next page presents a summary
comparison of the two approaches. 
Member state-driven resolution
The stated purpose of the BRRD is to harmonise
bank resolution practices across Europe in a way
that minimises costs for taxpayers while restoring
banking stability. If implemented by itself without
an SRM, this proposal directs all EU member states
to create toolkits for dealing with failing banks, a
resolution fund to finance the toolkits and a
national resolution authority to determine when a
bank is failing and how to deal with it. For exam-
ple, it establishes asset separation as one of four
resolution tools and lays out general guidelines
for how it can be used so that it can only be used
in combination with at least one of the other tools.
In the BRRD proposal, individual banks make so-
called recovery plans – typically updated annu-
ally – that are to be activated if the bank runs into
difficulty. These plans are approved by the bank’s
supervisor, either the national regulator or, for
large and systemically important banks, the Euro-
pean Central Bank under the newly established
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). However, if
the bank continues to have difficulty, member
state supervisors determine it is failing or is likely
to fail according to the BRRD's general guidelines.
If this determination is made, then it will be put
into resolution. The ECB will also likely be involved
in the decision for the larger banks under its
supervision. The NRA, using BRRD tools, comple-
mented by recommendations from the European-
level Systemic Risk Board and the European
Banking Authority, then draws up a resolution
plan. The European Commission must approve the
resolution tools to contain the costs of failed
banks. 
In the second section, we discuss the interests of
national resolution authorities (NRAs) and the
European institutions that will likely shape their
behaviour. Both will likely have an interest in pro-
viding public assistance to troubled systemically
important banks, but NRAs are more likely to have
reasons to use resolution tools to bailout a wider
group of banks with public funds rather than to
impose costs on them. Though these problems
will likely exist under any of the current propos-
als, the problems will likely be worse in a member
state-led system. In the final part, we show that if
the recent past is a guide, resolution authorities
will have close ties to member state politicians
who may have short-term incentives to under-
mine commitments to resolve banks in ways that
impose losses on them rather than on the public.
We argue that more attention should be paid to
making national resolution authorities more polit-
ically independent from governments. 
1 OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS
Each of the Commission’s proposals, the BRRD and
the proposed regulation establishing the SRM, has
guidelines on how to identify banks that are fail-
ing, and lays out who draws up the plan to deal
with these banks, including what tools are avail-
able, who implements the plan, how it is funded
and who oversees implementation. There are two
key differences between the proposals, which
have important implications for resolution out-
comes: who decides which banks need to be
resolved and how; and what happens if there is
non-compliance with EU rules. We discuss each in
More national More supranational
BRRD BRRD+SRM
National Resolution Authorities
largely creates resolution plans
and implement them.
Oversight by the Commission
following normal TFEU rules for
directives.
Single Resolution Board creates
resolution plans and delegates
implementation to NRAs.
Directly oversees implementation.
Figure 1: Diﬀerent possibilities for European asset separation decision-making and implementation
Source: Bruegel.4. The executive and deputy
executive directors will be
proposed by the Commis-
sion, reviewed by the Parlia-
ment and approved by the
Council.
5. Other organisations are
involved in this stage of the
process. The Board decides
if a bank is or will become
insolvent based on informa-
tion provided by the super-
visor, ie the European
Central Bank. The Board also
creates a resolution plan
based on the broad resolu-
tion framework set out by
the Commission.
European level-driven resolution
The Commission’s proposal from summer 2013 is
to have a regulation creating a Single Resolution
Mechanism for euro-area members and any other
member states that choose to join. For these coun-
tries this proposal subsumes the BRRD. It places
the responsibility for identifying failing banks and
planning their resolution at European level. It cre-
ates a Resolution Board that drives the resolution
process. The Resolution Board will be composed
of executive members4, representatives from the
Commission and the ECB, and representatives
from the NRAs. However, the ‘executive’ section of
the Resolution Board makes specific resolution
plans. European-level officials and NRA represen-
tatives from the affected member state(s) com-
prise it. No member of the executive section has a
veto over the resolution plan. The executive sec-
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plan in line with state aid rules. The NRA is then
responsible for implementing the plan. To the
extent that upfront public financing is required,
resolution will be paid for by a national resolution
fund pre-funded by the country’s banks.
The BRRD is a directive, which means it needs to
be transposed into national law. Ultimately non-
compliance with the BRRD would be identified by
the Commission and sanctioned after adjudication
by the European Union Court of Justice (ECJ)
using the normal procedures laid out in the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Importantly, even though they would be bound by
national laws resulting from European Union direc-
tives – particularly the BRRD and state aid rules –
member state authorities drive the resolution
process. They come up with the specific resolu-
tion plan and implement it.
Table 1: Comparison of the initial and summer 2013 Commission proposals
Which level decides which banks to resolve & how?
Original Commission proposal,
summer 2012 (BRRD)
Commission proposal, summer
2013 (BRRD + SRM-SBRF)
Who creates a recovery plan to
prevent the failure of a troubled
bank?
Banks create their own plans which
are approved by the relevant
supervisor (either national or SSM).
Banks create their own plans which
are approved by the relevant super-
visor (either national or SSM).
Who initiates resolution of a failed
bank?
Member States’ supervisors based
on rules set out in the BRRD.
Resolution Board based on informa-
tion provided by the ECB and based
on rules set out in the BRRD. The
Commission approves the Resolu-
tion Board’s decision.
Who creates the bank resolution
plan?
NRA with recommendations from
the Systemic Risk Board and Euro-
pean Banking Authority.
The Commission creates the gen-
eral plan, with the Executive portion
of the Resolution Board determining
the specific plan. Both are guided
by the BRRD toolkit.
Who creates cross-border
resolution plans?
Resolution Colleges including the
national resolution authorities and
the EBA. 
The Commission creates the gen-
eral plan, with the Executive portion
of the Resolution Board determining
the specific plan. Both are guided
by the BRRD toolkit.
Who implements the plan? NRA NRA
Who oversees the implementation? Commission to the extent that the
NRA’s actions violate the BRRD.
Resolution Board
Sanctions for non-compliance with
EU directives/plans?
Commission following the normal
procedures as per the TFEU.
The Resolution Board can circum-
vent the National Resolution
Authority and directly implement
the part of the plan the NRA is not in
compliance with.
How is the plan funded? National Resolution Funds Single Bank Resolution Fund
Source: Bruegel.Gandrud and Hallerberg  RESOLVING FAILED BANKS IN A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK
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BOX 1: CONTROVERSY OVER RESOLUTION FUNDING & IMPLICATIONS FOR RESOLUTION COSTS
The issue of how the resolution plans will be funded remains open. Though the focus of the Com-
mission’s proposals is to impose costs on bank shareholders, creditors and large depositors, it is
recognised that it may not be feasible to cover all of the resolution costs this way, especially as
immediate large bail-ins could cause bank runs and further instability. Public funding will be required
at least in the short term to, for example, purchase assets from failing banks and place them in a
public bad bank or provide liquidity to a bridge bank.
There are two points of contention regarding the structure of the resolution funds. The first is whether
or not the funds will be managed at member state or European level. The second is their primary
funding source: taxpayers or banks. 
Similar to many countries’ well established deposit insurance funds, the Commission’s BRRD and
BRRD + SRM proposals both call for resolution funds that are funded at the level of 1 percent of
deposits at banks through contributions from banks themselves made both ex antebefore a bank
is resolved and rebuilt ex postby contributions made after a resolution. The key difference between
the proposals is that in the BRRD-only plan, each member state sets up and administers its own
resolution fund. There is the possibility of cross-borrowing between funds. In the BRRD + SRM plan,
one fund is created for the entire banking union. It is referred to as the Single Bank Resolution Fund
(SBRF). The medium-term costs of bank resolution would primarily be spread across banks either
nationally in a BRRD-only system or across the whole SRM area under BRRD + SRM.
Another proposal that has been discussed, especially during the post-2013 election German coali-
tion government negotiations, is whether or not to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to
fund the SRM. This would be similar to the current arrangement for dealing with banks that need
support before a BRRD/SRM is created, especially as a result of the upcoming ECB-led stress tests.
The ESM is capitalised by member state taxpayers. It issues bonds that it can use to recapitalise
banks by providing loans to member-state governments, and once the SSM is fully established,
banks directly. Medium-term costs incurred by the ESM fall on member-state taxpayers.
Some, including Irish finance minister Michael Noonan, have proposed a combination of the two. In
a statement of 13 November 2013*, he argued that a single resolution fund should be created back-
stopped by the ESM, arguing that this was particularly important in the ten years before the SBRF is
fully capitalised.  
Using either a member state or European-level resolution fund that is ex anteand ex postfunded by
banks most directly protects taxpayers from resolution costs. Even if the ESM were used as an ulti-
mate backstop for these funds, the costs to taxpayers would be lower because (a) bank ex-ante
funds had already been used thus reducing the costs for the ESM and (b) presumably the system
would be designed so that the ESM could recuperate much of its costs ex postfrom the bank-funded
resolution funds.
The type of fund could shape not only taxpayer costs, but also total resolution costs by changing the
incentives and politics behind resolution decisions. Relatively healthy banks that are not major
creditors to troubled banks – and member states with healthy bank sectors – would likely oppose
costly resolution plans that rely on bank-funded resolution funds. They know that they will have to
make higher ex-postcontributions to the funds. If a taxpayer funded ESM is used and the ESM suf-
fers losses, the larger economies will bear the brunt of the costs. Moreover, even if the ESM does
not incur losses, such a system will likely increase moral hazard more than in the case in which
banks fund the system. In the latter case, banks might be more willing to police other banks, know-
ing that they will have to pay more into the fund if a given bank fails.
* Available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=78986. See for example Wall
Street Journal(2013) ‘Bank
Resolution Funds Needs
Poses Risks for National
Budgets-EU Lawyers’, 12
September, available at
http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/BT-CO-20130912-
703692.html.
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tion would decide which bank or banks need to be
resolved because they are or will become insol-
vent. It then sets out a resolution plan5. The plan
will primarily be funded by a European Single Bank
Resolution Fund (SBRF), that is pre-funded by
bank contributions. An important limitation of the
Resolution Board is that it cannot require member
states to use national fiscal resources to support
an institution in resolution. There is nonetheless
concern that taxpayer resources6might be used,
especially before the Single Bank Resolution Fund
is fully up and running (see Box 1).
The Board does not directly implement this plan
but delegates implementation to the relevant
member state’s NRA. The Resolution Board over-
sees the implementation. 
Importantly, the SRM is a regulation and would
take immediate effect once passed. This gives
European institutions more power to oversee its
implementation. In particular, the SRM empowers
the Resolution Board to implement directly parts
of the plan if it deems the NRA to be non-compli-
ant. In this proposal, the European-level institu-
tions drive the resolution process, but they still
depend on member states to implement it.
2 COMPARING GOVERNANCE ISSUES
Three key differences between the two possibili-
ties are: who sets out the resolution plan, how the
plan is monitored and how public assistance is
funded. In the European-led approach, the ‘exec-
utive’ section of the Resolution Board, with con-
siderable input from the Commission, sets out the
plan. It then delegates the implementation of the
plan to the NRA. The SBRF provides the funding
while the Board oversees compliance. In the
member state-led approach, the NRA sets out the
plan and implements it. They will rely on a national
resolution fund. 
To understand the implications of these scenar-
ios, we need to know the interests of the relevant
officials.
The interests of national resolution authorities
What are the interests of the NRAs? To answer this
question, we first need to know who the national
resolution authorities are and what mandate they
have. In both of the current proposals, the NRAs
are designated by member state governments.
They could designate the central bank, a financial
regulator, a deposit insurer, the ministry of finance,
a specialised authority and so on. To avoid
conflicts of interest, the current proposals require
that the part of the agency involved in resolution
be ‘functionally separate’ from the rest of the
institution. 
It is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of this require-
ment. How are the managers of the resolution
authority appointed? By whom? What is the
length of their tenure? All of these issues influ-
ence how independent the resolution authority is
in practice. This is an especially tricky issue
because unlike central banks or financial regula-
tors the resolution authority will not have much to
do during non-crisis times. As such, it will likely
run with a skeleton staff for most of the time and
then greatly expand during crises. The additional
staff may be seconded from the main organisa-
tion, their future prospects still tied to perform-
ance as evaluated by the overarching institution.
These are important issues because they influ-
ence the resolution authorities’ goals.
An important consideration in previous work on
bank policymaking is the closeness of politicians
to banks (see Rosas, 2009; Satyanath, 2006). The
simplest assumption is that banks would advo-
cate less strenuous resolution procedures that
would shift costs to banks. Politicians with crony-
istic relationships with banks could then pressure
NRAs to provide generous assistance to failing
banks. All else being equal, even healthy banks
might want less strenuous terms because they
may be creditors to troubled banks. They would
presumably wish to avoid being bailed-in. How-
ever, if support for bank resolution is provided by
a bank-funded resolution fund, individual banks
will have divided interests that could undermine
efforts to mount a concerted lobbying effort. Fail-
ing banks and banks that are significant creditors
of these banks would likely prefer bail-outs. Other
banks, which contribute to the resolution fund but
are healthy and not significant creditors, would
likely prefer strenuous bail-in type resolution as
they would effectively be paying for generous
support through ex-anteand ex-postcontributions07
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to the resolution fund. If a domestic fund is used,
they would be even more opposed to generous
support than if a European fund was used,
because their contributions would be much larger. 
Nonetheless there are at least two reasons why
domestic politicians might wish to provide gener-
ous support to failing banks: electoral incentives
and banking nationalism.
To win an election, a government will want the
economy to be performing well, possibly facili-
tated by credit growth. Authorities that are politi-
cally dependent, such as ministries of finance,
might have different incentives to independent
authorities as elections near. They may be more
inclined to boost their countries’ banks, the banks’
shareholders, creditors and depositors, and their
economies in the short-term by, for example,
hastily transferring toxic assets to bad banks at
unrealistically high values. Though such a move
would provide a boost to bank balance sheets and
help stabilise the wider economy over the short
term, it would also impose high longer-term costs
on the resolution fund and possibly the public if
the support exceeds the resolution fund’s
resources. Furthermore, even if a resolution fund
is mostly financed through banking sector contri-
butions and does not rely on direct taxpayer sup-
port, using it to provide unnecessary assistance
to troubled banks will lead to an inefficient alloca-
tion of capital, indirectly hurting citizens by con-
straining longer-term economic growth.   
The BRRD attempts to contain politically-moti-
vated drift. In the case of asset separation, for
example, it requires independent valuation of
assets that are transferred to the bad bank. How-
ever, this rule is malleable. The independent valu-
ation requirement can be waived in rapidly moving
crises when many of the bank failures will occur.
This gives NRAs room to make asset valuations
that may please specific constituencies, but
increase taxpayers’ resolution costs.
A number of authors have suggested that national
‘The Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive attempts to contain politically-motivated drift. In
the case of asset separation, for example, it requires independent valuation of assets that are
transferred to the bad bank. However, this rule is malleable.’
authorities in Europe have a ‘banking nationalism’
that inclines them to both want to support their
domestic banks and prevent these banks from
being acquired by foreign banks (eg Véron, 2013).
An important reason for banking nationalism is
that domestic banks are often a major purchaser
of their member state government’s bonds. Bank-
ing nationalism has clear implications not only for
how stringently banks are bailed-in or the size of
asset separation haircuts, but also choices about
to whom a bank or bridge bank is sold. Domestic
purchases might be favoured. For example, a
domestic regulator might back a domestic pur-
chase of a troubled bank for less than the bank
might have received from a foreign purchaser. 
The interests of the Resolution Board
What are the Resolution Board’s goals? How
closely are they aligned with the goals of the
BRRD? In the absence of an actual Resolution
Board to study, it is difficult to say definitively
what their goals will be. However, we can make a
number of educated guesses. 
European banking lobby groups have already
been important backers of European institutions’
– including the ECB, Commission and European
Parliament – policies (Epstein and Rhodes 2013,
p4). However, it is unclear what the interests of
European lobbying groups, such as the Associa-
tion for Financial Markets in Europe, would be in
relation to resolution decisions. Like for domestic
lobbying, using a resolution fund based on banks’
contributions would likely split banks’ support for
generous resolution programmes between trou-
bled banks and their creditors on one hand and all
other banks that contribute to the fund on the
other. 
Will the Resolution Board take action that is
directly against what a national government pub-
licly advocates, such as against the desired policy
of a member state with a failed bank? If the
member state insists it is in its national interest to
bail out a bank, it may be difficult for the Resolu-08
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tion Board to overrule it. It is also possible, how-
ever, that the Board faces pressure from other
member states because 'their' banks stand to lose
significant sums if they are the creditors that
stand to be bailed in.
There are institutional reasons why lobbying by
European banking associations and member
states may not generally be the primary drivers of
the Resolution Board’s interests. As noted above,
a permanent staff, the ECB and the Commission,
and the NRA in question compose the Board. The
permanent staff are meant to be technocrats who
do not represent any particular member state. One
assumption we might reasonably make is that
given the dominance of the politically independ-
ent ECB and the international-level Commission in
the Resolution Board’s executive section in which
the NRAs do not have a veto, and in which the
European-level actors can outvote them, it is likely
that the Board’s interests will be relatively closely
aligned with the goals of the BRRD. The ECB in par-
ticular is designed to ensure greater political inde-
pendence when it fulfils its mandate, while the
Commission should be insulated from the inter-
ests of shareholders, creditors and depositors of
banks in any one member state. 
There is another reason that less-stringent terms
may be given to banks that are systemically
important at European level. These banks are
more important to the European financial system.
Imposing, for example, tough bail-in conditions
may cause bank runs from creditors, sharehold-
ers and large depositors at both the bank being
resolved and its creditor banks. This could have
significant implications for both financial stability
and the supply of credit to the European economy.
To avoid this situation, the Resolution Board may
choose less-stringent resolution terms for banks
that are systemically important at the European
level. A useful comparison is with the United
States, where small and medium-sized banks are
regularly resolved by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation with costs generally imposed on
banks. During the recent financial crisis, after
policy-makers observed the consequences of
bailing-in Lehman Brothers’ creditors, the US gov-
ernment decided to commit taxpayers' money to
substantial bank recapitalisations.
Possible outcomes from these interests and
institutions
Under the most recent Commission proposal,
which gives primacy to the European level, the
Resolution Board can address issues of non-com-
pliance primarily by circumventing national reso-
lution authorities. If an NRA is non-compliant by,
for example, overvaluing assets being transferred
to a bad bank, then the Board can directly imple-
ment its policy to the extent that it can require
banks being restructured to comply. The decision
to do this will likely be made by the ‘executive’ por-
tion of the Resolution Board. None of the Board
members have a veto, including the NRA. It seems
that if non-compliance is identified, corrective
actions could be taken.
However, during a crisis and especially for the
asset separation tool, it will be difficult to identify
non-compliance. One of the main reasons for plac-
ing assets in a bad bank, rather than selling them,
is that their value cannot be easily determined.
During a crisis, there is a range of possible
medium-term values that a troubled asset could
have. The probability that the asset will have any
one value in this range is very difficult to deter-
mine (see van Suntum and Ilgmann, 2013, p368),
not least because this probability is conditional on
the outcome of the resolution programme, which
is itself uncertain. Due to this uncertainty, there is
a great deal of discretion in the determination of
asset values. National resolution authorities with
incentives to, for example, impose lower costs on
the banks despite medium to long-term public
costs could easily choose higher values for the
assets that they transfer to the bad bank, than
would have been chosen by authorities with dif-
ferent incentives. One way to avoid this problem
would be for the Resolution Board to set a flat or
fairly flat haircut for all acquired assets. Though it
is easier to observe deviations from a flat haircut,
this is a very blunt tool that may lead to severe
over- or under-valuations. 
Though enforcing compliance with an asset trans-
fer plan in the European-level approach will be dif-
ficult because of asset-value uncertainty, and will
depend heavily on the Resolution Board's and
NRAs’ interests, compliance with the BRRD will
likely be more uneven in a member state-led09
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approach. In a system in which the NRAs both
create and implement the resolution plan, the
power to set the resolution agenda is in the hands
of the NRAs. They may have many different goals,
such as protecting important banking-sector con-
stituents or improving the economy before an
election. In the European-level approach, the NRAs
could benefit from uncertain asset values to
achieve their own goals. This is a relatively limited
freedom of manoeuvre compared to the member
state-led approach. Here the member states will
likely have even more leeway to choose, for exam-
ple, which assets to transfer and at what price,
whether or not to use bail-ins and sales of the
business. They will be constrained by the rules set
out by the BRRD. However, enforcing these rules
will be difficult and time consuming. It will involve
the Commission first identifying a violation, some-
times a difficult task given, for instance, the uncer-
tainty surrounding troubled asset values. Then
there will be an ECJ adjudication process, rather
than a simple vote of a Resolution Board. 
By the time remedial action is applied it might be
long after the crisis, and long after assets have
been acquired at terms preferable to banks. The
threat of a possible sanction in the longer-term
might not dissuade a government that is worried
about being re-elected or satisfying a political con-
stituency in the short-term.
Even under a BRRD-only system, preferential
sales to domestic purchasers might be difficult for
NRAs. Outright discrimination against one pur-
chaser compared to another – for example
because of banking nationalism – is prohibited by
the BRRD. And it seems that it would be more dif-
ficult to circumvent this rule compared to, for
example, choosing high asset valuations when
there is uncertainty about an asset’s medium-
term value. Selling a business is a more drawn out
process than buying toxic assets. It would be more
easily observed by European institutions. Per-
haps, a more realistic scenario is one in which
national resolution authorities choose not to
pursue the sale of a business, though it may be
‘European-level authorities will likely not feel nationalistically towards a particular member
state’s banks. Therefore, the problem of a resolution plan avoiding the sale of an institution,
even if it is the best alternative for taxpayers, is less likely under a European-led system.’
cheaper for the resolution fund and taxpayer com-
pared to asset separation, out of fear that a foreign
buyer will present the most competitive bid.
Under the European-level approach the NRA will
not be able to choose which tools are used; it can
only influence their implementation. European-
level authorities will likely not feel nationalistically
towards a particular member state’s banks. The
opposite is probably more likely, in that the author-
ities want to promote European banking integra-
tion through cross-border mergers. Therefore, the
problem of a resolution plan avoiding the sale of an
institution, even if it is the best alternative for tax-
payers, is less likely under a European-led system.
Perhaps the NRAs will be more cost conscious if
they have to rely on national resolution funds,
rather than an external euro-area resolution fund?
There are problems with this assumption. It has
proved difficult to commit not to guarantee implic-
itly euro-area governments during banking crises.
This is because market actors have been worried
about the effect of contagion from a euro-area
country. Market concerns about contagion
increased borrowing costs for other imperilled
governments and even threatened the euro itself.
In order to avoid contagion, it is possible – or at
least member state governments could believe it
is possible – that an exhausted national resolu-
tion fund would be supplemented by funds from
other euro-area members, including borrowing
from other member states’ resolution funds and
the already established ESM.  
3 WHO ARE THE NATIONAL RESOLUTION
AUTHORITIES LIKELY TO BE?
In both the European and member state-level res-
olution proposals, the credibility of plans to
impose costs on failed banks and minimise tax-
payers’ expenses is highly dependent on the
NRAs. Who are these institutions likely to be? To
gain insight into the choices member states are
likely to make, we examine the choices they made
in the recent past.10
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We conducted a survey of bank resolution in the
European Union since the start of the global finan-
cial crisis until 2012. Following Sapir and Wolff
(2013), our survey was based on the Failed Bank
Tracker data set compiled by Open Economics.
Table 2 provides a list of the EU countries in which
we observed bank failures, national public insti-
tutions involved in resolution, and examples. In
general, ministries of finance were likely to be
involved in the resolution of larger banks. Of the
15 EU countries in the sample with bank failures,
in more than three-quarters (12) there were
instances of the member state’s ministry of
finance taking an important or leading role in bank
resolution. In some cases, other bodies, such as
financial regulators, appear to have taken the lead
on resolution for banks that were small relative to
the size of the member state's banking system. In
particular, the now defunct Financial Services
Authority took the lead in resolving many strug-
gling smaller building societies in the United King-
dom. The UK Treasury was much more involved in
the recovery and resolution of major banks, such
as the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Table 2: Examples of failing or failed banks in the EU, and national public institutions involved in
their resolution (2008-12)
Country Key institutions included in resolution Examples
Austria Ministry of Finance Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank International
Belgium Ministry of Finance Dexia, Fortis
Denmark Central Bank, Special Resolution Authority (Finansiel
Stabilitet)
Capinordic Bank, Fionia Bank
Finland Financial Supervisor (FIN-FSA) Sophia Bank
France Ministry of Finance Dexia
Germany Ministry of Finance, Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BaFin) (Current)
Hypo Real Estate
Greece Central Bank, Hellenic Financial Stability Facility TT Hellenic Postbank, National Bank of Greece
Ireland Ministry for Finance, Central Bank Anglo Irish, Irish Nationwide Building Society
Italy Ministry of Finance, Central Bank Delta, Bcc di Altavilla Silentina e Calabritto
Latvia Ministry of Finance, Bank Supervisor Parex bank, Latvijas Krajbanka
Lithuania Ministry of Finance, Central Bank Bankas Snoras AB
Netherlands Ministry of Finance, Central Bank Fortis, SNS REAAL
Portugal Ministry of Finance, Central Bank Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Banco Privado Português
Spain Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Special Resolution
Authority (Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring)
Bankia, Caja Sur
United Kingdom Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Financial Supervisor Royal Bank of Scotland, Chelsea Building
Society
Source: Bruegel based on the Failed Bank Trackerdata set compiled by Open Economics. In total there were 88 banks in the survey from the
European Union that were failing or failed. Note this includes banks that received public assistance and those that did not and were resolved
in another way, usually through being acquired by another private institution. This is most likely not an exhaustive survey. Also, given the often
rapid and complicated nature of bank failures, our data on national public institutions involved in resolution may be incomplete. It is also dif-
ficult to tell at this point each institution’s relative decision-making importance in each case.
What does this suggest about who national reso-
lution authorities are likely to be? If we simply
assume that the current 'resolution authorities'
will become the future NRAs, then it appears that
a large proportion of member states will choose to
place their NRAs either in, or closely associated
with, their ministries of finance. If they choose to
assign resolution duties ex ante to a different
authority independent of finance ministries, such
as an independent deposit insurer or a separate
specialised authority, then this will mark a major
shift in how banks are resolved in Europe. 
A shift like this could certainly happen. Gandrud
(2013) found that, since the 1990s both in Europe
and globally, there has been a move away from
ministry of finance involvement in financial super-
vision to more politically independent regulators.
An important component of this process for many
countries was strong promotion of independent
supervision by international and regional groups.
This suggests that the European Union, especially
the Commission and the European Central Bank,
could successfully promote the idea that NRAs
should be independent of political authorities.11
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However, so far there has not been much public
discussion of the topic. This is in contrast to the
concerted effort to get member states to adopt
independent fiscal councils. 
What about during a major banking crisis? Just
because an independent NRA is created before a
crisis does not mean that the ministry of finance
will not insert itself into the resolution process
during a crisis. It may have strong political incen-
tives to do so, while the scale of the crisis could
mean that further public financing from the treas-
ury is required. For instance, the involvement of
finance ministries in many bank resolutions
recently was not due to a pre-established resolu-
tion plan, but was borne out of political imperative,
generally to avoid widespread bank failures by
using some sort of publicly funded assistance. For
example, the Dutch Ministry of Finance nation-
alised the Dutch operations of the large cross-
border bank Fortis not as part of a pre-determined
plan, but in order to prevent the deterioration of
the economy that a collapse of the bank could
have caused. There are many ways ministries
could exert influence over NRAs during a crisis.
One example given earlier is the provision of staff
on secondment to the NRA, but with career
advancement prospects tied to the ministry.    
What does this suggest about likely governance
problems under the two resolution proposals?
Both proposals rely on national resolution author-
ities. If recent trends of active involvement of the
finance ministry in resolution translates into NRAs
being closely aligned with national finance min-
istries, then many NRAs will likely have incentives
to pursue policies, such as over-valuing assets
transferred to a bad bank, that may please a par-
ticular constituency, but which could lead to more
costly resolution. If, on the other hand, strongly
politically independent NRAs are created, politi-
cally motivated drift from the commitments set
out in the BRRD may be less severe. Nonetheless,
because it is up to the member states to decide
who the NRAs are, there will likely be variation
across Europe under both proposals. Some coun-
tries will create independent NRAs, while others
will create more politically dependent ones. 
Under the member state-led proposal, NRAs have
considerable power to set the agenda as well as
implementation power. It will be more difficult to
address non-compliance with the BRRD. In the
European-led proposal, the Resolution Board and
Commission set the agenda and can more easily
address non-compliance. The NRAs are relevant
under both proposals, and there will be variation
depending on the composition and independence
of the institutions member states pick to be their
NRAs. We expect more variation in how well NRAs
resolve failed banks in a cost effective way under
the national approach, than under the more supra-
national one.
4 CONCLUSION
Of the competing approaches to a European
framework for recovery and resolution, a more
supranational approach may lead to more consis-
tently credible commitments to resolve bank fail-
ures at minimum public expense, especially when
the asset separation tool is used. However, ‘more
consistent’ certainly does not mean that the com-
mitments’ credibility will be equally strong across
all bank types and situations. Failing banks that
are systemically important to Europe will likely
receive more generous public support when they
are in trouble. Thus regulatory preventative meas-
ures are vital complements to any of the proposed
resolution systems. 
Also, regardless of the resolution system chosen
when public support is provided to failed banks, it
should be given from a bank-funded resolution
fund. Such funds would reduce taxpayers’ direct
costs, and would also change banks’ incentives to
take risks that lead to bank failures and dampen
advocacy for bailouts.
Under any of the current proposals, NRAs will play
an important role. How well an individual member
state commits to effective resolution will depend
‘Of the competing approaches to a European recovery and resolution framework, a more
supranational approach may lead to more consistently credible commitments to resolve bank
failures at minimum public expense.’12
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on whom they choose for their national resolution
authority and what governance structure this
institution has. If national resolution authorities
are going to resolve failing banks, it is important
that more effort is given to specifying who the
NRAs are. At a minimum, this means that a
framework for strongly independent NRAs should
be developed and heavily promoted, especially by
the Commission and the ECB. It would even be
worth pursuing a stronger legal requirement for
independent NRAs that share characteristics with
fiscal councils. Note that fiscal councils do not set
fiscal policy in European member states, but they
do comment publicly on what course of action a
given government is taking. In any resolution case
that involves public money, one would expect that
the finance ministry would be involved. Like an
independent fiscal council, an independent NRA
would be more likely to engage the public and to
make such decisions in a way that is more
transparent and more likely to protect taxpayers.
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